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Abstract  
This article critically engages with the predominant understandings of repetitive bodily 
practices within a dementia context. Rather than interpreting such practices as pathological 
and abnormal, I instead approach them through an ethnographic mapping, paying particular 
attention to the affective dynamics of repetition. Critically developing Fernand Deligny’s 
insights and methods of tracing and mapping bodily movements in dialogue with Tim Ingold’s 
notion of dwelling, I demonstrate affect-underpinned encounters and interactions of repetitive 
phenomena. I then argue for the extension of recent anthropological discussions about affect, 
repetition, and subjectivity by suggesting a more productive dialogue among theories of affect, 
body, atmosphere, cognition, memory, language, and life history. 
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Over the course of a decade of voluntary work, and a year’s intensive fieldwork in an Orthodox 
Jewish care home (‘the Home’) in London from 2014 to 2015,1 I observed the somewhat 
repetitive bodily practices of residents living with dementia. For example, as I detail below, 
Daniella and Ayla had patterned bodily movements and utterances as they headed to the dining 
room for breakfast, where they had pre-arranged seats and a designated table partner at a 
scheduled time and place. To minimise any confusion, distress, or anxiety that could be caused 
by changing seating arrangements, the Home recommends that, at the beginning of their 
residency, residents choose their own seats, in consultation with staff and significant others, 
to reflect their interests and preferences. Since Daniella and Ayla came to the Home in 2011 
and 2010 respectively, their bodies had thus repeated, habitualised, and routinised this ‘task’ 
of sitting down for a meal. 
What drew my attention was how, despite this routinisation, their journeys to their seats were 
heterogeneous and dependant on encounters and interactions with their immediate social, 
organisational, and material surroundings. Care workers often perceived and described these 
journeys in a negative way, drawing attention to residents’ repetitive sayings, behaviours, and 
actions, such as obsessing about a particular seat, pacing, murmuring, asking the same 
questions, uttering the same statements, knocking, withdrawing, and so forth. Accordingly, 
they treated Daniella and Ayla’s bodily practices as either just signs of institutional 
routinisation, or as behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia – referring, for 
example, to Daniella’s ‘wandering’ and ‘obsession’ and Ayla’s ‘anxiety disorders’ and 
‘depression’.  
In recent decades, some anthropologists have taken the feeling body as a central theme, as the 
‘existential ground of culture and self’ (Csordas 1994). Beyond thinking of it as a mere recipient 
of or witness to cultural symbols and representation, the feeling body has come to be regarded 
not only as a ‘source’ of perception, but also as constitutive of social practice and culture 
through the everyday bodily encounters through which people dwell in the world (De Antoni 
and Dumouchel 2017, 191). There has been a dramatic increase in studies of people’s 
subjective experience of living with dementia (including self, subjectivity, and personhood), 
which together challenge the cultural and biomedical construction of unbecoming and social 
death (see, for example, Chatterji 1998; Cohen 1998; Hydén and Antelius 2017; Kaufman 
2006; Leibing 2006; McLean 2007; Taylor 2008). Nevertheless, as Elizabeth Herskovits (1995) 
points out, people continue to struggle with the very notion of self and the constitution of 
 
1  Ethical approval for the research was obtained from an NHS research ethics committee. All 
identifiable data are anonymised.  






subjective experience. Indeed, we still experience a twofold ontological and epistemological 
crisis in recognising dementia (Herskovits 1995; Hinton and Levkoff 1999; Taylor 2008) and 
in ways of knowing dementia (Leibing 2006; Lock 2005). People with dementia are often 
described as ‘the displaced’ in a ‘non-place’ (Reed-Danahay 2001, 48), or as being in a ‘timeless 
world’ (Edwards 2002, 184, italics in original; see also Gjødsbøl and Svendsen 2019). 
Furthermore, to date, little scholarship has explored the affective dimension of people’s lived 
experience of dementia – that is, how those affected perceive, think, attune to, and respond 
to their worldly surroundings. Even less scholarly attention has been paid to the relationship 
between the creative, expressive, performative bodily dimension of affect and repetitive 
phenomena in the dementia context.  
Rather than interpreting repetitive actions and utterances as pathological and abnormal, in this 
article I aim to extend how we approach, perceive, and understand such repetitive phenomena 
through the use of cartographic ethnography, paying particular attention to the affective 
dynamics of repetition. To this end, I first address the potential of cartographic ethnography 
by drawing on the work of Fernand Deligny, in line with Tim Ingold’s notion of dwelling, to 
better approach repetition as bodily affective practice. After tracing Daniella and Ayla’s 
journeys to breakfast, I highlight the affective differentiation of repetition that feeling bodies 
act and enact. Daniella and Ayla, I show, directly engage with their ever-changing lifeworld in 
terms of glance, facial expression, tone, tempo, and rhythm, in a form of bodily ‘resonance’ 
and ‘correspondence’ (Ingold 2017, 19). I argue for a move away from predominant 
biomedical perceptions of repetitive bodily practices and towards understanding them in terms 
of their affective affordance in the making of subjectivity. This leads to my critical engagement 
with recent ontological and affective turn/oriented research, specifically that which focuses 
on ontogenetic multiplicity, relational epistemology, and discursive practice. Finally, I suggest 
that the subject is a being-in-becoming; that is, that dementia emerges in the process of 
dynamic, complex, and recurrent interactions, responses, and encounters with its immediate 
surroundings.  
Methods: Mapping feeling bodies 
What do Daniella and Ayla’s repetitive practices do? By shifting the intellectual focus from the 
causes or meanings of these bodily experiences to their values and functions, the affective 
dynamics of repetition in individual residents invite us to consider an alternative to 
conventional approaches (e.g., biomedical and therapeutic) and analytical tools (e.g., surveys, 
observation, and interpretation). This shift demands a new approach that, rather than merely 
representing the phenomena, can identify the processes of individual events and the relations 
between repetitive practices and other constitutive components of social life.  






Deligny and Ingold offer theoretical as well as practical and ethical insights, which I use to 
explore how bodily movements, affect, and sensation emerge in the formation of subjectivity 
– a subjectivity with which, resonating and corresponding, people dwell in the world. This 
generates a number of questions. First, can an ethnographic mapping change the ways we 
perceive, look at, and think about repetition, and thus provide a broader understanding of 
subjectivity in dementia? More specifically, can the lines of movements on the map transcribe 
the ways in which the subtle, sometimes barely recognisable or otherwise messy and entangled, 
affective dimensions of repetition are shaped and operate in everyday encounters? How can 
individual action and response be differentiated and identified from mundane repetition 
without recourse to established concepts, terms, and thoughts? Finally, how should 
cartographic ethnographers identify the ordinary affective practices that are entangled not only 
with felt experience but also with discursive and cognitive experience? 
Deligny strongly rejected not only the predominant clinical experiments and institutionalised 
and therapeutic interventions of his times, but also the pre-existing psychiatric categories, 
thoughts, and terms. From the 1950s until his death in 1991, Deligny and his colleagues 
operated ‘residential communes’ in the Cévennes in France, working and living with children 
and young people living outside of language, namely those with autism (Milton 2016, 285). 
Deligny’s approach does not categorically differentiate children with autism on the basis of 
their capacities or abilities to speak, learn, remember, and communicate, nor does it 
normatively separate the normal and the pathological (Miguel 2015, 137). It also does not see 
people with autism as mere objects of research, but as both subjects and co-travellers. In doing 
so, Deligny leads us to ‘draw lines, to initiate an approach not through language’, which his 
dwellers do not have, but instead ‘through their patterns of movement’ (Logé 2013). Indeed, 
as he watched these people move around, Deligny drew the lines of their bodily movements 
on a map, producing what he called ‘wander lines’. His cartographic wander lines do not only 
offer the foundation of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s rhizomatic thoughts, but also show 
us the immediate interactions and encounters involving ‘tension and friction’ in everyday life 
through their torsive, flexible, and vivacious lines of movements (Ingold 2015, 4; see also 
Deleuze and Guattari 1983). Mapping is thus neither the interpretation nor representation of 
people with autism, but rather ‘the implicit trace of an activity’ (Ogilvie 2013, 407) – namely, 
the ‘tracks and traces’ of their slightest bodily movements (Wiame 2016, 44; see also Deleuze 
1998). As such, cartographic ethnography allows us to conceptually and empirically explore 
the bodily affective dimensions of repetition in language, behaviour, gesture, posture, and/or 
attitude through bodily spatial emergence and expressive performativity. It also allows us to 
demonstrate bodily repetitive practices not as context-free, biomedically and therapeutically 
diagnosed, static forms of abnormal episode, but rather as the moving, networking, and 
expressive performativity of feeling beings – a performativity that, I will show, continues to 
resonate with the lives of residents, logics of care, and atmosphere through intensive and 
attentive co-correspondence.  






Whilst Deligny’s thoughts and practices provide inspiration for an alternative mapping practice 
in dementia, Ingold (2007, 2015) is interested in lines of movements from the perspective of 
a relational ecology of life. He claims that everyone and everything dwelling in the world travels 
along lines, entangled and enmeshed with one another. More importantly, Ingold questions 
how we live and experience the world, namely through line-making, advocating ‘direct 
perception through [bodily] engagement’ (Knusdsen 2016, 187), rather than merely 
interpreting and translating based on a language-privileged epistemology. Beyond the 
disembodied mind-body and nature-culture dualisms, Ingold (2000) urges us to situate our life 
by directly attending to the world which we inhabit. He thus overcomes a problem of 
translation, what he calls ‘the logic of inversion’ (1993, 225), where the detached observer 
often ‘decontextualises’ or even ‘re-contextualises’ another’s life, culture, or knowledge from 
an ethnocentric perspective and then ‘inverts back again’ as a representation of the other 
(Knusdsen 2016, 188). It is particularly invaluable for the study of dementia that this relational 
ontogenetic notion of dwelling provides a continuous and open-ended world-making from 
the subjective perspective, which is ‘the same world viewed from another vantage point within 
it’ beyond Cartesian dualism (Ingold 1993, 226).  
Drawing upon Heidegger’s (1971) concept of dwelling, Ingold’s dwelling perspective embraces 
a relational understanding of human beings ‘as a singular locus of creative growth within a 
continually unfolding field of relationships’ (Ingold 2000, 5). Animal life and the natural 
environment are never predetermined, nor isolated from human life; rather, they emerge in 
the process of direct engagement. Recognising Jacob von Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt – 
‘the world as constituted within the specific life activity of the animal’ (Ingold 1995, 62) – 
Ingold claims that every creature has its own way of experiencing its world: while a spider can 
intersect with the life of a fly through its web, the spider does not know the fly’s world (2011, 
79–80). Ingold regards such a quality as ‘affordance’, taking James Gibson’s concept of 
affordances of the environment; that is, what it ‘offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes 
for good or ill’ (Gibson 1979, 127). Affordance refers to the characteristics of an environment 
which are only available to the organism through its concerns, needs, and skills, and which 
provide valuable options for action. To paraphrase, for a person living with dementia, a cup 
of tea can be perceived as ‘drinkable’ but a wet floor as ‘less walkable’ – in Deligny’s terms, an 
‘ecological competence’ (Sauvagnargues 2016, 164). The affordance of an object is thus not 
an inborn quality, but the way it is perceived, understood, and appropriated by an observer 
through direct perception rather than through enculturation (Ingold 2018).  
Taking these insights together, I initially drew a basic map of the material landscape showing 
points of reference (in Deligny’s terms, ‘spotted/markers’) in the everyday life in the Home; 
for example, the communal area, restaurant, care workers’ desk, sofa, kitchen, lift, window, 
tables, and so on. On the map, I then drew the trajectories of thirteen individual residents’ 






journeys to the dining room as they went to have breakfast each day. As time went by, diverse 
forms, patterns, rhythms, and intensities of lines of movements emerged, and soon my map 
was covered with lines that curved, zigzagged, juxtaposed, stopped and restarted, went 
nowhere, and so on. For additional information, I added some words and images alongside 
the wander lines – which I call ‘wayfaring lines’ –2 including images of eyes, a walking frame, 
the sun and clouds, and words describing dragging, frowning, shaking, crying, and other 
affective feelings. Between August and October 2014, I mapped the bodily affective practices 
of twelve residents living with early to moderate dementia and one resident without dementia. 
Due to the limited space available here, I focus only on two residents (Daniella and Ayla).  
Table 1. Demographic data for key participants. 
Glance 
Daniella walked in a lively way, with long and light steps, towards the dining room. She was 
greeted by the morning sun, gentle classical music, and delicate smells of baked bread and 
fresh fruit coming from the kitchen. Standing at the entrance to the dining room, she gently 
closed her eyes for a moment. With a contented smile, she looked into the dining room. She 
suddenly shook her head as if disappointed, and then moved around the room. Usually she 
would go directly to her designated seat, but this time she walked slowly, zigzagging. She 
looked over each table and asked the other residents what they were having for breakfast. Yet, 
no meaningful conversations seemed to take place. Daniella often spoke in a very weak voice, 
murmuring to herself, so it was unlikely that the other residents could understand what she 
 
2  Deligny’s French term ‘lignes d’erre’ is variously translated as ‘lines of drift’ by Brian Massumi in A 
Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004), ‘lines of wandering’ by Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam in Dialogues II (Deleuze and Parnet 2007), and ‘wander lines’ by Sandra Alvarez 
de Toledo in Cartes et lignes d'erre/ Maps and Wander Lines: Traces du réseau de Fernand Deligny, 1969-
1979 (Alvarez de Toledo 2013). In this article, I use ‘wayfaring lines’ to capture the tendencies and 
orientations of lines that are neither predetermined nor preconditioned; instead, they are open-
ended, situational, contingent, and heterogeneous. More importantly, at this time, the term 
‘wandering’ – meaning an aimless moving and walking in general – is avoided within the dementia 
context because of its unhelpfulness in understanding the nature and characteristics of this 
repetitive behaviour; instead, the terms ‘walking/moving around’ are favoured since they imply 
purposeful and intentional action.  






was saying. She even left the table before the other residents could reply. Some had already 
been distracted by her presence and her intermittent knocking, and had stopped eating their 
meals to look at her with a frown. Maria, a staff member in her late forties, asked Daniella not 
to stand in between the tables and to sit down in her place so that other residents could get 
past. When Daniella finally arrived at her table, though, she still hesitated before sitting down. 
This was unusual behaviour for Daniella, who had become well-known for her obsession with 
her seat, not only among staff but also among other residents: since her arrival at the Home 
in 2011, she had never given up her chair to another person, despite sometimes insisting that 
others yield theirs to her. Maria asked Daniella again if there was a problem. Daniella said 
something, but it sounded as though she was mumbling to herself again. However, it was clear 
that she had changed her mind and decided not to sit down after all. She moved to the 
neighbouring table, where Maria was assisting another resident, Hyden, with her meal. Daniella 
tried to take a seat next to Hyden, but soon stood up again. She got up and down repeatedly, 
and walked around the table. Hyden was distracted and her meal dripped from the side of her 
mouth. Maria asked Daniella to sit down in her seat and to stop interrupting Hyden. After a 
while, Daniella left and walked to the bar in front of the Milky (dairy food) kitchen for 
breakfast. She picked up a bowl and took some cereal. At this moment Chaya, her table 
partner, entered the dining room. Daniella smiled brightly and her eyes opened wide, and then 
greeted Chaya and stood aside for her friend to pass. Chaya went to her seat, put her 
belongings on it, came back to the bar, and looked over the two types of cereal. Daniella 
stopped talking and followed Chaya with her cereal, looking cheerful and happy, as though 
nothing had happened.  
Daniella’s customary movements were typically direct and purposeful, often corresponding 
with Chaya’s. On this occasion, however, Daniella’s lines of movements were much more 
complicated than usual, emerging in forms of straight, zigzagged, and juxtaposed lines. What 
drew my attention was her sudden stopping – a slight faltering, though momentary, at the 
entrance of the dining room. This was quite different from other occasions when she either 
came with her table partner or else found her already in the dining room. This moment of 
faltering reminded me of Daniella’s social relations, in that she was almost always with Chaya, 
who had become a best friend since they had met each other in the Home. This transformative 
movement of Daniella’s bodily feeling reveals how place, things, and social relations shape 
affective atmosphere and, at the same time, how Daniella’s feeling body attunes to, resonates 
with, and is attached to the constantly changing here-and-now situation. In this regard, Ingold 
(2000) provides an insightful conceptual framework of ‘affective atmospheres’, in line with 
Gernot Böhme’s (1993) notion of ‘atmosphere’, to understand the relationships between 
people, things, and atmosphere. Böhme (1993, 122) understands atmosphere as something 
that should neither be isolated nor seen as ‘free floating’; rather, it ‘is the reality of the perceived 
as the sphere of its presence and the reality of the perceiver, insofar as in sensing the 






atmosphere she/he is bodily present in a certain way’. Looked at this way, Daniella’s dramatic 
transformative glance revealed the immediate and unmediated affective response to the here-
and-now, which has hitherto been largely unexplored, kept within the bracket of individuals’ 
trivial bodily movements or pathological signs or symptoms. Despite being so familiar and 
ubiquitous as to be ‘the very medium of human transaction’, and the foundation of human 
perception and knowledge, the ‘glance’, whose forms range from a mere blink to a piercing 
look, has received little attention in academia (Casey 1999, 80).  
As Daniella’s glance across the threshold of the dining room suggests, her relations with 
others, things, and the environment were distanced by a momentary affective transformation, 
which was revealed through her frowning and shaking her head. Strikingly, the return journey 
of the glance is not always travelled or distributed equally. Daniella was initially satisfied with 
her surroundings: the classical music, the smells of bread and tea, and the warm morning 
sunshine. But this was quickly transformed into disappointment over the absence of Chaya, 
reflected in her glance. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964) argues, trees do not see the seer (us) 
in the same way as the seer sees them; our glance is not merely mechanical or metaphysical, 
but is always relational, interdependent, and intersubjective, relating not only to people but 
also to non-human entities and our surroundings. Because of this asymmetrical relation 
between seeing and being seen, the glance is always open-ended, undetermined, and indefinite, 
something ‘above and beyond’ the ready-made interpretive look or language-oriented gaze that 
only flows in a one-directional or lineal way (Logé 2013). In other words, the glance does not 
indicate a state of glancing, but rather a way of becoming that is characterised as ongoing 
bodily rhythmic movement and transformation through encounters and relations within a 
milieu. Consequentially, ‘glance’ is defined not as a noun but as a verb involving a duration of 
movement, however momentary, and the opening and closing of one’s eyes is characterised as 
interdependent, contingent, and relational. As such, Daniella’s glance infinitely bifurcates and 
diffuses in the process of interactions and encounters. Needless to say, every single momentary 
transformation within the glance becomes ‘a source of the differentiation of duration and the 
absolute newness of each becoming’ (Casey 1999, 97). 
Face 
It was 8.45am. Like Daniella, Ayla paused at the entrance to the dining room, glancing at her 
surroundings. Her glance lasted a little longer than Daniella’s quick look. Due to her 
deteriorating vision, caused by senile macular degeneration and cataracts, she had to work hard 
to perceive and sense her here-and-now situation. Ayla often stood still, expressionless. A care 
worker passed by her, gently taking her hands and greeting her warmly. Ayla quickly traced 
the origin of the touches and voice and guessed who the care worker was. After exchanging 
short greetings, Ayla tried to talk about her daughter, but the staff member had already walked 






a short distance away, telling Ayla that they could talk later, after breakfast. Ayla sighed and 
then started walking again, extremely slowly, dragging rather than pushing her walking frame. 
After every step, she stopped for a moment to look at her surroundings. She was often 
suddenly startled, prompting her to gaze around and linger for a while, looking in the direction 
from which she had heard something. Although it was only a short distance from the entrance 
to her seat, Ayla’s way of walking meant that it usually took her a substantial amount of time 
to get there.  
Ayla continued to look around until she recognised me sitting at another resident’s, Dorona’s, 
table, and she stopped walking. Her pupils dilated and her previously inexpressive face broke 
into a bright expression, a mixture of surprise and delight. She stretched out her arms and took 
hold of my hands, saying she had missed me so much, and asking where I had been and what 
I had been doing over the past few days. I told her that I had been trekking over the weekend 
with my housemates, and asked her about her weekend. She said, disappointed, that nothing 
had happened and it had been quite tedious. She did not mention her daughter’s visit the 
previous Saturday. After she had finished telling me about her weekend, we were quiet for a 
moment, and I suggested she sit down. However, she did not want to move; instead, she 
turned towards Dorona’s table and continued to talk. Ayla asked about my family and my 
studies. She did not wait for me to finish before asking what I would be doing that day, and 
so on. Then her voice trembled as she started to talk about her daily life at the Home, asking 
me to take her home to where she used to live with her late husband. I had heard this many 
times from Ayla. As her story progressed, her face, complexion, and emotions were 
dramatically transformed. Her voice faltered and I saw that she was about to burst into tears. 
She asked again whether I could take her out of the Home. Holding her faltering hands and 
looking at her tearful face, I listened to her for a while. The sensory assemblage of classical 
music, morning sunshine and food, and the presence of other residents was suddenly 
diminished in the shadow of the affective scenes. Ayla did not move, blocking the other 
residents and staff, and continued to tell me about her insecure and anxious situation. 
Although Dorona looked uncomfortable, Ayla does not seem to be paying her any attention. 
Dorona stopped drinking her tea to look up at us, but did not join in the conversation, nor 
did she complain about Ayla; after a while, she just looked out of the window. I told Ayla that 
I was in the middle of a meal with Dorona, and asked her if she would like to move back to 
her own chair. Taking a step aside, Ayla looked around the table for an empty seat. She tried 
to sit on the other side of Dorona, where she had never sat before, but I expected that Frederik 
(who normally sat there) would soon come to move her, so I told her that she should sit in 
her designated seat by the window. I guided her there, telling her that I would be back after 
finishing my breakfast with Dorona. Ayla was not able to sit and wait to be served by staff; 
she did not even look at the menu. She got up and sat down repeatedly with a slightly annoyed 
expression on her face, as if she felt that there was nothing of interest to her there. She turned 






again towards Dorona’s table, looking at us with a miserable face, as if she was yearning for 
me to come as soon as possible. Her helpless and hopeless facial expressions reflected how 
she felt. 
Once Dorona had finished her breakfast, I moved over to Ayla. She grabbed my hands again 
and looked at me with a desperate face. Gayora, her table partner, and Yedida, her friend at a 
neighbouring table, had not arrived yet. I took a chair from the next table and sat on her right-
hand side, leaving Gayora’s seat free. I asked her what she wanted to eat. She waved at the 
menu and said that nothing was suitable for her because everything was dull and dry. For her, 
the meals in the Home were not good enough to eat. Instead of breakfast, she proposed going 
out for a cup of tea and cake in the garden café. Her voice still faltered slightly. The café was 
not open yet so I suggested that she have a light meal now and we could go for a walk another 
day. I explained that I was very tired because I had been busy overnight. She listened to my 
story and started to eat. Her brow became less furrowed and the deep wrinkles around her 
eyes smoothed out and straightened. Her face became calm, and her immediate disposition 
was gradually transformed as she settled and became peaceful.  
As Ayla’s gestures, postures, attitudes, utterances, and bodily movements in relation to Dorona 
(and myself, the other residents, and staff) showed, her encounters with others were not 
uniform. In particular, her facial expressions did not always reflect the same intensity of 
feeling, nor did they merely represent or mirror her static inner voices. The signifiers do not 
always match with the signifieds; there are always slippages, excessiveness. Unlike Charles 
Darwin’s generalised and categorised facial expressions in The Expression of the Emotions ([1872] 
1965), Ayla’s face was constantly transforming in the process of interacting and encountering 
with the faces of others. As Silvan Tomkins (1995, 89) argues, the face is of ‘the greatest 
importance in producing the feel of affect’. Indeed, Ayla’s expressive facial feelings not only 
appeared in the process of resonating and corresponding with her immediate milieu, involving 
‘the facial muscles, the viscera, the respiratory system, the skeleton, changes in blood flow, 
vocalisations, and so on’ (Thrift 2004, 75). They were also in the process of assembling her 
past enmeshed affective bodily experiences with staff members, residents, and the researcher, 
and her consequential expectation, hope, or imagination.  
Likewise, how Ayla approached and perceived a face was quite different from the Levinasian 
face. According to Emmanuel Levinas (2012), the face of the Other is characterised as 
vulnerable, naked, and defenceless; the impossibility of reducing the Other to sameness brings 






persons to a particular relation that demands an ethical obligation of caring for the Other.3 
Such a primary and primordial sense of responsibility towards the Other is only established 
through pre-epistemological and pre-ontological face-to-face encounters (Levinas 1989). In 
contrast to Levinasian ethical, pre-reflective encounters with the face, Ayla sensed the face 
through its enactment of communication, socialisation, and individualisation. It neither merely 
reflected her thoughts and feelings at a time, nor was it fixed, but was made up of potential, 
existing in the form of the virtual (Deleuze 1986, 99). It was also non-identical, implying that 
a face is much more transformative, complicated, and multidimensional than Levinas argues, 
emerging in the process of ongoing interaction, communication, and encounters (Deleuze 
2004). Accordingly, in order to explore the ways in which Ayla perceived and related to the 
faces of others, we need to ask not what a face is or what a face can represent, but what a face 
can do (Rushton 2002). To take this a step further: Ayla’s face showed a varied mode of 
repetitive expressive performance in the process of immediate engagement. This repetition 
then invites reflective and intensive methods of response and resonance. Paradoxically, 
because of this unknowability and unfamiliarity with the reflective and thoughtful faces of 
people around her, the faces of others in turn call for an eternal return to figure out this 
mystery. In contrast to the reflective face, the intensive face is characterised as transformative, 
transitory, and dynamic. Ayla moved and felt at the same time, resonating with the faces of 
others and her surroundings with diverse and ever-changing facial expressions and voices that 
differed in tone, speed, and volume. The affective and sensory dimensions of Ayla’s repetitive 
bodily actions, enactments, and utterances, exposed through bodily performativity, are 
embedded in her bodily affective practices.  
As such, Ayla’s feeling body and her feelings are closely connected, ‘resonating together, 
interfering with each other, mutually intensifying, all in unquantifiable ways apt to unfold again 
in action, often unpredictably’ (Massumi 2002, 1). In particular, I take her anxiety, 
hopelessness, and helplessness as evidence of her existential crisis, which is described as lines 
of bodily movements (however slight), gestures, postures, and utterances on the map. These 
wayfaring lines illustrate Ayla’s feelings of insecurity and unfamiliarity with the dining room, 
even though she repeats this routine daily. In Heidegger’s sense ([1953] 2010, 328), she feels 
her own existential experience of ‘not-being-at-home’, but this does not mean that her 
ontological being is nullified or has become an ‘inauthentic being’. Instead, she responds to 
and resonates with the world in the most dramatic and singular way, on her own terms and 
within her capacity. In other words, Ayla’s anxiety is embedded in the individual parts of her 
 
3  The ‘Other’ is a translation of the French autrui which signifies ‘the other person’ or ‘someone 
else’. Levinas usually uses it in the singular to emphasise face-to-face relations that happen one at 
a time.  






organs, sinews, and muscles, while her organic body simultaneously reflects such feelings, 
affects, and emotions by transforming, relating, adding, relieving, and exposing. These 
individual becomings of bodily expressive performativity on her face reveal a kind of 
momentary transformation, constructing her ever-changing subjectivity in repetition, and 
concomitantly providing a platform for us to witness the formation of her subjectivity.  
Tone, tempo, and rhythm 
While wayfaring lines help us to consider how affective experiences emerge by tracing how 
Daniella and Ayla’s feeling bodies sensed and perceived the world surrounding them, these 
lines also lead us to rethink a range of affective tones, tempos, and rhythms, which are revealed 
through lines of expressive performativity. As feeling bodies move, their wayfaring lines 
become entangled with the lines of others, with things and the material environments 
unfolding the affective ‘meshwork’ of social, material, and temporal lines (Ingold 2011, 63). 
Daniella’s walking becomes entangled with different tempos, speeds, durations, and rhythms. 
For example, her behaviour and attitude when she saw Chaya were different from how she 
was around Hyden. Her ways of walking before and after encountering Chaya differed in terms 
of the intensity of her step: when Chaya appeared, she no longer hesitated, nor was she slow-
footed, instead stepping lightly and quickly. Likewise, depending on whom Daniella was 
talking to, the length, tonality, and volume of her utterances are different. When she is familiar 
with residents, she stays longer, conversing in a friendly way with them. Otherwise, her voice 
is weak and she mumbles, as it was in the example described above. Notably, when Daniella 
reached a table where three male residents were sitting, she did not even knock on the table, 
nor did she ask them anything; instead, she just passed by onto the next table. Although she 
hesitated for a while when Maria asked her not to interrupt the other residents’ breakfast, she 
continued to knock and to ask questions.  
Meanwhile, Ayla’s wayfaring lines move extremely slowly, but this does not mean that she 
stops moving; her sense and sensibility are rather widely exposed to her surroundings. She is 
easily frightened and reacts quickly to external sensory, haptic, and motor stimulations, such 
as the sound of kitchen utensils falling, hearing her name, or a touch on her body. As such, 
her lines of affect appear to become more sensitive, hypervigilant, and vulnerable, although 
her bodily resonances towards such exterior-sensorial stimulations dramatically fade away 
once she recognises who/what they are and where they come from. Likewise, in the example 
above, once Ayla recognised my face, her shaking and restless wayfaring line was no longer 
divergent or swaying; instead, she tried to bring herself closer to my lines of movement and 
almost synchronised with me, expressing her fluctuating and multifarious affective feelings 
through her bodily performativity. Since Ayla moved into the House in 2010, we had 
established a very close relationship. She often asked care workers about me when she had not 






seen me for a while. Although she hardly ever remembered my name, all the care workers 
working in the unit recognised who she referred to as ‘the care boy’. As such, her different 
intensities of embodied and kinaesthetic affinity revealed her heterogeneous expressivity of 
affective perceptions towards other people and things around her.  
Indeed, Ayla repetitively told me that there was hardly anything and anyone that she was fond 
of in the here-and-now moment. Unlike in the home she had shared with her late husband, 
there were no oak trees in the garden at the Home; no rooms like the ones she used to play 
Bridge, knit, and read in with her best friends; no memories of her families and pet dogs; and 
none of the beautiful furniture that she used to polish every day. Her vision had deteriorated 
dramatically, meaning she could no longer knit, which had been one of her favourite things to 
do; this also put an end to my personal knitting lessons, one of her happiest hours. After falling 
several times, Ayla had had a hip operation in 2014, and accordingly she could no longer walk 
or run like she used to. Although she disagreed and was unwilling, she was strongly urged to 
use a walking frame, which she described as ‘disgusting’ and ‘ugly’. She had also lost two teeth, 
and her beauty accessories, such as rings, earrings, and underwear, kept being ‘stolen’.  
Quickly, Ayla’s facial complexion gained colour and soon turned to yellow, pale, and then red. 
Her hands faltered and her eyes became watery and red. Her pulse was suddenly beating fast. 
Her past experiences and memory made her body resonate, rising and falling ‘not only along 
various rhythms and modalities of encounter but also through the troughs and sieves of [her] 
sensation and sensibility’ (Seigworth and Gregg 2009, 2). Simultaneously, her expressive bodily 
performativity echoed my response. When she started talking, she poured out what she wanted 
to say and spoke almost without stopping. And then once there was a lull in the conversation, 
her voice became weak and thin, and she spoke as if there were tears in her eyes. Her 
expression quickly transformed into one of misery.  
If the purpose of communication is to connect or mediate with others – to establish a certain 
relation or network by using verbal or nonverbal language – then repetitive actions, doings, 
and utterances are a form of communication. For example, Daniella’s speech was performed 
in the form of a soliloquy, yet her affect was expressed outwardly. Here, the terms of language 
must be applied carefully. Her movements, gestures, sensations, and mumblings did not imply 
that she wanted to communicate anything directly; rather, her communication emerged in the 
process of repetition, as a mode of (dis)connection and of (non-)being. As Henri Lefebvre 
(2004, 6–7) suggests, every rhythmic repetition inherently involves differentiation in the 
process of engagement with the surroundings as life enfolds – what Ingold calls ‘differences 
within repetition’ (2011, 60). A corollary of this is that Daniella’s steps and murmurings echo 
not only her changed situation, but also her attentive attunement, by way of differentiating her 
steps. In other words, her wayfaring implied an empty feeling due to the absence of Chaya, 






and the minute differences in intensities of wayfaring lines addressed her affinity to and 
belongings towards her surroundings based on her fragmented memory and here-and-now 
affectivity. In this context, I agree with Ingold’s extension of André Leroi-Gourhan's (1993, 
309–310) notion of ‘rhythmic quality’ to ‘rhythmic repetition’. Ingold (1999, 437, 2011, 60) 
claims that repetition is not mechanical and automatic but rather that each movement is ‘felt’ 
and recognised through the body in the process of continuous bodily ‘attunement’ to ever-
changing circumstances. Therefore, affect concerns not only attending, attuning, and 
responding to the world, but also weighing the relative significance, intention, or tendency of 
events, things, people, and situations. In other words, an affective quality is neither neutral nor 
a mere representation of the reality, but emerges as a way of experiencing, perceiving, and 
expressing. It is part of the process of engaging and encountering through which people dwell 
in the world. This complexity suggests a need to revitalise the relational qualities of repetitive 
practices in dementia by shifting away from the individual intrinsic value and singularity 
underpinned person-centredness (Kitwood 1997) to relatedness with one another dwelling in 
the world. The relational understanding of affect should be foregrounded in perceiving 
intercorporeal and intersubjective social fabric (Blackman 2012; Blackman and Couze 2010). 
In other words, the bodily repetitive practices of these two residents are already and always 
situated dementia-in-the-world, not as a pre-existing individual entity, but as a process that 
emerges ‘through entangled processes of relating’ (Juvonen and Kolehmainen 2018, 4) and 
which is characterised as contingent, distributive, and heterogeneous. 
Relational understanding of affective and discursive practices 
Daniella and Ayla’s repetitive practices are neither coherent nor stable; they are instead often 
fragmented, dissonant, and fluctuating. It would be impossible to understand why, for 
example, Daniella’s and Ayla’s wayfaring lines changed so dramatically within a very short 
period of time if I traced single lines of movement alone, without comparing them with other 
lines and their own past traces of encounters and relations. However, Daniella and Ayla’s 
relations and encounters seem to be neither open-ended or transparent, nor all-inclusive or 
neutral; their lines of movements show kinds of movements such as (un)cutting, twisting, 
diverting, overlapping, corresponding, knotting, and so on. Unlike a Deleuzian 
conceptualisation of affect as rhizomatic and open-ended movement, in reality the possibility 
of these two residents’ social fabric and their ways of weaving the network are limited by the 
specific social, biographical, organisational, and environmental circumstances. Their affective 
performativities are not evenly or uniformly shared, but are heterogeneously and contingently 
distributed across people, things, and surroundings at a particular time. Thus, the fabric of 
social relationships correspondingly affects and is affected by this distributed complexity.  






Deligny distinguished between people with autism and subjects in a theoretical way and found 
it necessary to ‘juxtapose’ his co-travellers with subjects (Milton 2016, 286). Strictly speaking, 
the mapping forced him to see an autistic mode as an ‘a-subjective, a-reflexive presence that 
nevertheless does belong to our world to the extent that this a-subjectivity is also a part of 
ourselves as subjects, the part that is linked to space and place’ (Ogilvie 2013, 409). It is 
through this that Deligny attempted to reveal the ontological logic of people with autism as 
‘acting’ outside of notions of self, ‘inhabiting a pre-lingual network’ in contrast to that of the 
‘humans-that-we-are’: that is, ‘a kind of idealised functional state of normative humanity’ living 
in ‘the symbolic world of language’ (Milton 2016, 286; see also Deligny 2013, 2015). Deligny 
did not see autism as pathological, but as a different way of sensing, acting, moving, being, 
and dwelling in the same world. Contrary to speaking subjects, Deligny would call the children 
‘mute’ rather than ‘autistic’ and rarely used the terms ‘subject’ or ‘subjectivity’ in relation to 
people with autism (Ogilvie 2013, 409).  
Here, Deligny’s cartographic, residential experiments and Ingold’s dwelling perspective 
together provide invaluable insights about how to know the other, not only in and of itself, 
but also in relation with one another. They also suggest ways for dwelling well with others 
living in the same world, calling for a relational understanding and embracing the modern 
distinction between the way of knowing and the way of being. In particular, their ways of 
addressing events, encounters, and interactions through bodily performativity (Deligny) and 
direct engagement (Ingold) offer inclusive, generative, ethical, and empowering ways of 
approaching and understanding beyond mental and physical capacity and ability. As Jeannette 
Pols (2005, 216) points out, even people in the advanced stages of dementia ‘enact’ situated 
and relational ‘appreciations’ through expressive performativity in the process of immediate 
engagements, and this calls for a shift from ‘the patient perspective’ to ‘the subject/patient 
position’. In this sense, it is reasonable for Ingold to differentiate his ‘ontogenetic multiplicity’ 
from Philippe Descola’s (2013) ‘ontological pluralism’. Ingold criticises the latter as a ‘museum 
of ontology’, in that: 
the one world we inhabit is not a world that is primordially the same for all, yet which 
offers a limited set of solutions for its comprehension, but a world of perpetual and 
potentially limitless differentiation, in which ‘coming to terms’ is a lifelong task that is 
carried on, just as life is, in the very conduct and unfolding of our relations with others. 
(Ingold 2016, 302–303) 
In other words, Daniella and Ayla’s affective practices are characterised as an evaluative or 
appraisal capacity of meaning-making through which people, things, and the environment 
appear to them as ‘friendly’, ‘worthwhile’, ‘indifferent’, and so on; namely, ‘affective 
affordance’ (Gibson 1979). For example, despite Ayla’s imagination, hope, and desire that she 






could go back to her home in North London, she remains ‘stuck’ in a ‘hospital’, as she 
describes it. However, her discordance and dramatic transformation of affective quality must 
be read as her singular way of resonance and correspondence as lived experience, or what 
Marilyn Strathern suggests as ‘cutting the network’ (1996) through ‘partial connections’ (1991).  
The dramatic fluctuations of Daniella and Ayla’s wayfaring lines show a need to rethink 
repetitive practices in terms of affective intensity. As described above, the forms of the two 
residents’ bodily resonances are quite different. They depend not only on relations and 
encounters given their situated time and space, but also on the affective qualities of these 
relations and encounters, which are closely involved with here-and-now embodied memory, 
cognition, belonging, imagination, and expectation. Daniella and Ayla perceive time differently 
in the same place, and they have often even experienced time confusion or an absence of time 
perception, moving around the Home at midnight or early in the morning. It is the here-and-
now moment that I focus on: the momentary transformation of lines of movements in 
dialogue with Henri Bergson’s (1919) and Deleuze’s (1988) understandings of time and 
becoming – more precisely, how the residents perceive and experience the flow of time. From 
Daniella and Ayla’s perspective, temporality is experienced ‘not as linear but as dynamic and 
heterogeneous’: time does not flow only ‘from past to present to future’, but is ‘multiple and 
assembling’ (Coleman 2008, 86). The trajectories of these two residents’ affective practices tell 
us that the ways the residents synthesise time are neither neatly arranged nor transcendental. 
Here, two residents’ different forms of bodily practices raise a reasonable doubt about how 
affective feelings charge bodily resonance in response to their compromised memory, 
cognition, language, and expectation. These are not only manifested through their pre-
reflexive bodily movements, but are also reflected and expressed through their ordinary, 
habitual, and routinised bodily engagements and encounters.  
In this respect, it seems too narrow an approach to regard these affective qualities only as ‘pre-
cognitive, pre-symbolic, pre-linguistic and pre-personal lived intensities’ (De Antoni and 
Dumouchel 2017, 92; Massumi 2002), or as ‘a substrate of potential bodily responses, often 
automatic responses, in excess of consciousness’ (Clough and Halley 2007, 2). As Pia Kontos 
(2004, 2005, 2006) argues concerning ‘embodied selfhood’ and ‘embodied memory’ – building 
on Merleau-Ponty’s ([1962] 2002) work on embodiment and Pierre Bourdieu’s (2013) work 
on habitus – Daniella and Ayla’s bodily movements express not only ‘primordial’ but also 
‘socio-cultural ways of being-in-the-world’, performing their entangled and complex social and 
material relationality between ‘body-self and body-world’ (Kontos, Miller, and Kontos 2017, 
184). Weaving the two residents’ repetitive practices offers a much deeper understanding of 
not only primordial and unconscious aspects of affect, but also discursive meaning-making 
through ‘affective practices’ (Wetherell 2012). Unlike other affective-turn advocators inspired 
by the works of Spinoza, Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi, Margaret Wetherell (2012, 
19) brings together felt experience and discursive practice, suggesting affective practice as ‘a 






figuration where body possibilities and routines become recruited or entangled together with 
meaning-making and with other social and material figurations. […] [An] organic complex in 
which all the parts relationally constitute each other’. By taking into consideration such 
discursive practice, her concept of affective practices allows an understanding of how feelings, 
discourse, memory, cognition, and thoughts are interwoven in everyday life in dementia. In 
other words, as dementia fluctuates and evolves, embodied affectivity correspondingly 
emerges, relying more on pre-reflexive and less on discursive practices. 
Conclusion: Affective affordance in the making of subjectivity 
Drawing on Deligny’s cartographic method, I have attempted to extend his thoughts and 
practices not only beyond disciplinary boundaries, but also beyond an individualised and 
medicalised gaze. His legacy offers an understanding of the ontological primordial 
commonalities of mobile and networked beings outside of language and symbols. It also 
provides informative epistemological and methodological insights for studying the affective 
dynamics of repetitive practices in dementia. I now suggest expanding our understanding of 
the singularity of emerging subjectivity as dementia-becoming in repetition, and I build a 
potential affective space for dwelling focused on movements, sensations, and affects. These 
lines of affective performativity are themselves the manifestation of individual residents’ 
singular ways of subjects-becoming: in sometimes (un)comfortable and (un)familiar 
circumstances, residents repetitively attempt to (re)make relations with (or distance themselves 
from) the lives of others, things, and their surroundings. In this process, subjectivity is 
expressed and exposed in a range of different modalities, such as moving around, glancing, 
rhythmic movement, and facial expression, and with different intensities of feeling, affect, and 
emotion in response to the ever-changing lifeworld.  
The daily breakfast schedule consists of the same routine over and over again. Care practice 
becomes standardised and routinised through repetition, and eventually such repetitive bodily 
experiences are normalised, as residents are rarely asked about their bodily feelings and 
conditions except as part of medically and therapeutically guided care (Goffman 1961). But 
are Daniella and Ayla both on the same journey with these repetitive itineraries? Evidently, 
they are not. When Daniella and Ayla encounter the details of light, smell, people, atmosphere, 
tables, and weather, they, as wayfarers, continuously resonate with their surroundings in 
astonishingly varied ways over time. As such, their repetitive practices can be characterised as 
bodily affective affordance, and repetition should be reconsidered as generative, relational, and 
situational in the world. Needless to say, repetition here does not mean the exact same actions 
as before, nor does it refer to something completely different with no relation to past 
experience and memory. Rather, past events and memories exist in the present ‘virtually’, 
though often fragmented, so people continue to selectively resonate (through their ways of 






calling, retrieving, or forgetting) with them as potentially ‘real’ (Deleuze 1988). The future is 
pulled into the ‘actual present’ in the form of ‘passive expectation’ through ‘contraction’ and 
‘synthesis’ (Deleuze 2004, 94–96). In this regard, the repetitive lines of movements are the 
entangled meshwork of those affected, where their relations and lives comprise a mode of 
dwelling ‘in an open world’ (Ingold 2008, 1809) that has ‘neither beginning nor end’, such that 
‘a line of becoming is always in the middle’ (Ingold 2011, 83).  
Likewise, cartographic ethnography should not be regarded as a finished work, because the 
lines of movements of these two residents will continuously accumulate or disappear as they 
constantly respond to and resonate with their surroundings. The subject is an entanglement 
of the new creation of singularity generated by the logic of difference and repetition (Deleuze 
2004). It is no surprise that the act of drawing concretises ‘a theatre of subjectivity’ from 
Deligny, Deleuze, and Guattari’s point of view (Wiame 2016, 38); it thus emphasises the 
expressive and performative aspects of subjectivity, as well as the process of its formation, 
which is characterised in this article as affective affordance – that is, ‘dementia-becoming’.  
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